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 arbitration function


SLA Management in Reconfigurable Multi-Agent RAG: A Systems Approach to Question Answering

Iannelli, Michael, Kuchipudi, Sneha, Dvorak, Vera

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to generalize to new information by decoupling reasoning capabilities from static knowledge bases. Traditional RAG enhancements have explored vertical scaling -- assigning subtasks to specialized modules -- and horizontal scaling -- replicating tasks across multiple agents -- to improve performance. However, real-world applications impose diverse Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, involving trade-offs among objectives such as reducing cost, ensuring answer quality, and adhering to specific operational constraints. In this work, we present a systems-oriented approach to multi-agent RAG tailored for real-world Question Answering (QA) applications. By integrating task-specific non-functional requirements -- such as answer quality, cost, and latency -- into the system, we enable dynamic reconfiguration to meet diverse SLAs. Our method maps these Service Level Objectives (SLOs) to system-level parameters, allowing the generation of optimal results within specified resource constraints. We conduct a case study in the QA domain, demonstrating how dynamic re-orchestration of a multi-agent RAG system can effectively manage the trade-off between answer quality and cost. By adjusting the system based on query intent and operational conditions, we systematically balance performance and resource utilization. This approach allows the system to meet SLOs for various query types, showcasing its practicality for real-world applications.


User-customizable Shared Control for Fine Teleoperation via Virtual Reality

Luo, Rui, Zolotas, Mark, Moore, Drake, Padir, Taskin

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Shared control can ease and enhance a human operator's ability to teleoperate robots, particularly for intricate tasks demanding fine control over multiple degrees of freedom. However, the arbitration process dictating how much autonomous assistance to administer in shared control can confuse novice operators and impede their understanding of the robot's behavior. To overcome these adverse side-effects, we propose a novel formulation of shared control that enables operators to tailor the arbitration to their unique capabilities and preferences. Unlike prior approaches to customizable shared control where users could indirectly modify the latent parameters of the arbitration function by issuing a feedback command, we instead make these parameters observable and directly editable via a virtual reality (VR) interface. We present our user-customizable shared control method for a teleoperation task in SE(3), known as the buzz wire game. A user study is conducted with participants teleoperating a robotic arm in VR to complete the game. The experiment spanned two weeks per subject to investigate longitudinal trends. Our findings reveal that users allowed to interactively tune the arbitration parameters across trials generalize well to adaptations in the task, exhibiting improvements in precision and fluency over direct teleoperation and conventional shared control.


Arbitration and Stability in Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions

Zick, Y., Markakis, E., Elkind, E.

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Overlapping Coalition Formation (OCF) games, introduced by Chalkiadakis, Elkind, Markakis, Polukarov and Jennings in 2010, are cooperative games where players can simultaneously participate in several coalitions. Capturing the notion of stability in OCF games is a difficult task:deviating players may continue to contribute resources to joint projects with non-deviators, and the crucial question is what payoffs the deviators expect to receive from such projects. Chalkiadakis et al. introduce three stability concepts for OCF games---the conservative core, the refined core, and the optimistic core---that are based on different answers to this question. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for the study of stability in the OCF setting, which encompasses the stability concepts considered by Chalkiadakis et al. as well as a wide variety of alternative stability concepts. Our approach is based on the notion of arbitration functions, which determine the payoff obtained by the deviators, given their deviation and the current allocation of resources. We provide a characterization of stable outcomes under arbitration. We then conduct an in-depth study of four types of arbitration functions, which correspond to four notions of the core; these include the three notions of the core considered by Chalkiadakis et al. Our results complement those of Chalkiadakis et al. and answer questions left open by their work. In particular, we show that OCF games with the conservative arbitration function are essentially equivalent to non-OCF games, by relating the conservative core of an OCF game to the core of a non-overlapping cooperative game, and use this result to obtain a strictly weaker sufficient condition for conservative core non-emptiness than the one given by Chalkiadakis et al.


Stability Via Convexity and LP Duality in OCF Games

Zick, Yair (Nanyang Technological University) | Markakis, Evangelos (Athens University of Economics and Business) | Elkind, Edith (Nanyang Technological University)

AAAI Conferences

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, and therefore it is important to know under what conditions the core of a game is guaranteed to be non-empty. Two notions that prove to be very useful in this context are Linear Programming (LP) duality and convexity. In this work, we apply these tools to identify games with overlapping coalitions (OCF games) that admit stable outcomes. We focus on three notions of the core defined in (Chalkiadakis et al. 2010) for such games, namely, the conservative core, the refined core and the optimistic core. First, we show that the conservative core of an OCF game is non-empty if and only if the core of a related classic coalitional game is non-empty. This enables us to improve the result of (Chalkiadakis et al. 2010) by giving a strictly weaker sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the conservative core. We then use LP duality to characterize OCF games with non-empty refined core; as a corollary, we show that the refined core of a game is non-empty as long as the superadditive cover of its characteristic function is convex. Finally, we identify a large class of OCF games that can be shown to have a non-empty optimistic core using an LP based argument.